" ... They do what they know" : assessing the impact of geography upon the strategy, operations, and tactics of two American military campaigns in South Vietnam / by Jeffrey D. Wilhelm.
| Author/creator | Wilhelm, Jeffrey D. author. |
| Other author | Palmer, Michael A., degree supervisor. |
| Other author | East Carolina University. Department of History. |
| Format | Theses and dissertations |
| Production | 2003. |
| Description | 139 leaves ; 28 cm |
| Supplemental Content | Access via ScholarShip |
| Subjects |
| Summary | The purpose of this thesis is to examine the geographic impact of the Central Highlands and the Mekong Delta upon America's strategies, operations, and tactics during the first three years of the Vietnam conflict. While previous histories have briefly alluded to the intrinsic role that geography played in the conduct of American operations, an anomaly that pervades most of these accounts is the conspicuous absence of any detailed analysis concerning the specific strategic and tactical implications imposed by Vietnam's geography. In order to access the mountains of the Central Highlands and the perennial swamps of the Mekong Delta, the U.S. Army deployed the Airmobile 1st Cavalry and the Mobile Riverine Force. This thesis will examine the initial operations of both newly created military forces in accordance with the theoretical principles related to strategic and tactical geography. What effect did the geography have on the costs and efficacy of conducting airmobile and riverine operations in the Highlands and the Delta? Did American strategists properly prepare for the unique geographic peculiarities of the Mekong Delta and the Central Highlands, before deploying the 1st Cavalry and the MRF? If so, did the American military accurately modify its tactics to correspond with the strategy? The 1st Cavalry and the MRF proved that the terrain of the Highlands and the Delta could be operationally overcome. On the other hand, the strategic geography of both regions caused unsustainable costs in non-combat casualties and equipment failures. Therefore, neither the Cavalry nor the MRF ever fought at full-strength, and never demonstrated the ability to maneuver other troops quickly to reinforce engaged units. Furthermore, at the tactical level, the geography could not be overcome in terms of mobility, which left troops often tethered to fire-support for survival. Thus, while American strategists gained dramatic increases in operational mobility, the 1st Cavalry and the MRF greatly overstepped estimated strategic and operational costs and ignored a host of tactical restrictions on the battlefield. As a result, airmobility and riverine operations strategically and tactically offered nothing more than a sophisticated form of attrition. |
| General note | Presented to the faculty of the Department of History. |
| General note | Advisor: Michael A. Palmer |
| Dissertation note | M.A. East Carolina University 2003 |
| Bibliography note | Includes bibliographical references (leaves 135-139). |
| Genre/form | Academic theses. |
| Genre/form | Academic theses. |
| Genre/form | Thèses et écrits académiques. |
Availability
| Library | Location | Call Number | Status | Item Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Joyner | University Archives | ASK AT SPECIAL COLLECTIONS DESK | ✔ Available | Request Material |
| Electronic Resources | Access Content Online | ✔ Available |