Explanatory solutions to skeptical problems / Kevin McCain.
| Author/creator | McCain, Kevin, 1980- author. |
| Format | Book |
| Publication | Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2025. |
| Description | viii, 162 pages ; 24 cm |
| Subjects |
| Contents | Explanations and skeptical problems -- Phenomenal explanationism revisited part I: appearances as evidence -- Phenomenal explanationism revisited part II: evidential fit and PE in action -- Pyrrhonian problems -- The Cartesian problem -- Memory problems -- Humean problems. |
| Abstract | "Phenomenal Explanationism (PE) is a powerful new theory of epistemic justification that combines an explanationist conception of evidential support with a phenomenal conception of evidence. According to PE, epistemic justification is a matter of what best explains our evidence, which ultimately consists of appearances. It is a complete internalist theory of epistemic justification that delivers on the promises of other appearance-based theories while avoiding their pitfalls. In Explanatory Solutions to Skeptical Problems, Kevin McCain expands his previous work by demonstrating how PE offers solutions to a host of perennial skeptical problems including the problem of the criterion, the regress of justification, external world skepticism, memory skepticism, and inductive skepticism. The promise that PE displays in responding to these skeptical problems makes it plain that it is a viable theory of epistemic justification worthy of careful consideration." -Book jacket. |
| Bibliography note | Includes bibliographical references and index. |
| Issued in other form | Electronic version: McCain, Kevin, 1980- Explanatory solutions to skeptical problems. Oxford : Oxford University Press, [2025] 9780198905547 |
| LCCN | 2025930036 |
| ISBN | 9780198905516 |
| ISBN | 0198905513 (hardcover) |
| Standard identifier# | CIPO000189038 |
Availability
| Library | Location | Call Number | Status | Item Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| On Order for Joyner Library | Unavailable | Place Hold |