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010 a| 2016462756;

020 a| 149874527Xq| hardbackq| alkaline paper;

020 a| 9781498745277q| hardbackq| alkaline paper;

035 a| (WaSeSS)ssj0001682935;

042 a| lccopycat;

049 a| EREEa| NEHH;

050 00 a| T57.9b| .H385 2016;

082 04 a| 658.4/0342| 23;

100 1 a| Hassin, Refael.=| ^A1299430;

245 10 a| Rational queueingh| [electronic resource] /c| Refael Hassin, Tel Aviv University, Israel.;

260 a| Boca Raton, Florida :b| CRC Press, Taylor & Francis Group,c| [2016];

300 a| xiii, 378 pages :b| illustrations ;c| 25 cm;

500 a| "Chapman & Hall book.";

504 a| Includes bibliographical references (pages 301-362) and indexes.;

505 0 a| Observable queues -- Information -- Customer decisions -- Social optimization and cooperation -- Monopoly -- Competition -- Routing in queueing networks -- Supply chains, outsourcing, and contracting -- Vacations -- Bounded rationality.;

506 a| Available only to authorized users.;

520 a| "Rational Queueing provides one of the first unified accounts of the dynamic aspects involved in the strategic behavior in queues. It explores the performance of queueing systems where multiple agents, such as customers, servers, and central managers, all act but often in a noncooperative manner. The book first addresses observable queues and models that assume state-dependent behavior. It then discusses other types of information in queueing systems and compares observable and unobservable variations and incentives for information disclosure. The next several chapters present relevant models for the maximization of individual utilities, social welfare, and profits. After covering queueing networks, from simple parallel servers to general network structures, the author describes models for planned vacations and forced vacations (such as breakdowns). Focusing on supply chain models, he then shows how agents of these models may have different goals yet they all profit when the system operates efficiently. The final chapter allows bounded rationality by lowering the assumption of fully rational agents."--c| Provided by publisher.;

538 a| Mode of access: World Wide Web;

650 0 a| Queuing theory.=| ^A7646;

650 0 a| Probabilities.=| ^A14253;

650 0 a| Consumer behavior.=| ^A231577;

650 7 a| Consumer behavior.2| fast0| (OCoLC)fst00876238;

650 7 a| Probabilities.2| fast0| (OCoLC)fst01077737;

650 7 a| Queuing theory.2| fast0| (OCoLC)fst01085713;

655 0 a| Electronic books.=| ^A491897;

856 40 z| Full text available from eBooks on EBSCOhostu| https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=1204408&scope=site&custid=s5822723&authtype=ip,shib;

947 a| (OCoLC)ocn922920174;

949 a| CLICK ON WEB ADDRESSw| ASISh| JOYNER188;

949 a| CLICK ON WEB ADDRESSw| ASISh| HSL77;

949 a| CLICK ON WEB ADDRESSw| ASISh| JMUSIC60;

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998 a| 6780609;

999 a| CLICK ON WEB ADDRESSw| ASISc| 1i| 6780609-1001l| JNETm| JOYNERr| Ys| Yt| JNESSBKu| 7/19/2026x| EBOOKz| JERESOURCE;

999 a| CLICK ON WEB ADDRESSw| ASISc| 1i| 6780609-2001l| HSLELECm| HSLr| Ys| Yt| HEBKu| 7/19/2026x| EBOOKz| HERESOURCE;

999 a| CLICK ON WEB ADDRESSw| ASISc| 1i| 6780609-3001l| MNETm| JMUSICr| Ys| Yt| MNESSBKu| 7/19/2026x| EBOOKz| JERESOURCE;

Rational queueing / Refael Hassin, Tel Aviv University, Israel.

Author/creator	Hassin, Refael
Format	Electronic
Publication Info	Boca Raton, Florida : CRC Press, Taylor & Francis Group, [2016]
Description	xiii, 378 pages : illustrations ; 25 cm
Supplemental Content	Full text available from eBooks on EBSCOhost
Subjects	Queuing theory. Probabilities. Consumer behavior.

Contents	Observable queues -- Information -- Customer decisions -- Social optimization and cooperation -- Monopoly -- Competition -- Routing in queueing networks -- Supply chains, outsourcing, and contracting -- Vacations -- Bounded rationality.
Abstract	"Rational Queueing provides one of the first unified accounts of the dynamic aspects involved in the strategic behavior in queues. It explores the performance of queueing systems where multiple agents, such as customers, servers, and central managers, all act but often in a noncooperative manner. The book first addresses observable queues and models that assume state-dependent behavior. It then discusses other types of information in queueing systems and compares observable and unobservable variations and incentives for information disclosure. The next several chapters present relevant models for the maximization of individual utilities, social welfare, and profits. After covering queueing networks, from simple parallel servers to general network structures, the author describes models for planned vacations and forced vacations (such as breakdowns). Focusing on supply chain models, he then shows how agents of these models may have different goals yet they all profit when the system operates efficiently. The final chapter allows bounded rationality by lowering the assumption of fully rational agents."-- Provided by publisher.
General note	"Chapman & Hall book."
Bibliography note	Includes bibliographical references (pages 301-362) and indexes.
Access restriction	Available only to authorized users.
Technical details	Mode of access: World Wide Web
Genre/form	Electronic books.
LCCN	2016462756
ISBN	149874527X hardback alkaline paper
ISBN	9781498745277 hardback alkaline paper

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