Epistemic duties new arguments, new angles / edited by Kevin McCain and Scott Stapleford.

Other author McCain, Kevin, 1980-
Other author Stapleford, Scott.
Format Electronic
Publication InfoNew York ; London : Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2021.
Description1 online resource.
Supplemental ContentFull text available from Taylor & Francis eBooks
Supplemental ContentFull text available from eBooks on EBSCOhost
Subjects

SeriesRoutledge studies in epistemology
Abstract "There are arguably moral, legal and prudential constraints on behavior. But are there epistemic constraints on belief? Are there any requirements arising from intellectual considerations alone? This volume includes original essays written by top epistemologists that address this and closely related questions from a variety of new, sometimes unexpected, angles. It features a wide variety of positions, ranging from arguments for and against the existence of purely epistemic requirements, reductions of epistemic requirements to moral or prudential requirements, the biological foundations of epistemic requirements, extensions of the scope of epistemic requirements to include such things as open-mindedness, eradication of implicit bias and interpersonal duties to object, to new applications such as epistemic requirements pertaining to storytelling, testimony and fundamentalist beliefs. Anyone interested in the nature of responsibility, belief or epistemic normativity will find a range of useful arguments and fresh ideas in this cutting-edge anthology"-- Provided by publisher.
Bibliography noteIncludes bibliographical references and index.
Access restrictionAvailable only to authorized users.
Technical detailsMode of access: World Wide Web
Source of descriptionDescription based on online resource; title from PDF title page (Site, viewed (04/28/21).
Issued in other formPrint version: Epistemic duties New York : Routledge, 2020. 9780367141103
Genre/formElectronic books.
LCCN 2019059793
ISBN9780429030215 (ebk)
ISBN(hbk)

Availability

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Electronic Resources ✔ Available