| Abstract |
"I have two main aims in this part of the book. The first is to pin down what regret is. My view, to put it nounally, is that regret is the painful feeling of self-chastisement (i.e., self-reproach, self-rebuke, self-recrimination, etc.) resulting from doing something that one thinks is a mistake. To put it verbally, to regret is to reproach oneself for acting poorly (more specifically, to reproach oneself for making a decision that is not justified by one's practical identity). This means that there are two components of regret. First, to regret is to experience the sting of self-reproach, which constitutes its phenomenological core. Second, regret concerns the things that we do, that is, our actions. More specifically, I claim that regret concerns our mistakes. This means that I treat regret as a distinct emotion, which differs from other, related emotions, such as guilt, remorse and disappointment. It also means that I reject many existing philosophical discussions of regret, especially Bernard Williams's account of agent-regret, according to which we can and, more importantly, ought to, regret things that we do entirely unintentionally / involuntarily. The focus on mistakes is central to the second aim, which is to identify when we should regret the things that we have done. This involves distinguishing different senses of "should", which, in turn, requires identifying the different reasons we can have for regret. As I explain, what is of fundamental importance is whether our regret is "fitting", that is, whether the features of the situation we are in "warrant" regret. The challenge is then to ascertain what features of a situation render regret a fitting response to it. I argue that it is when we make mistakes, and only when we make mistakes, that the situation warrants regret. Of course, this involves explaining what constitutes a "mistake". I argue for an evidence-relative perspectivist account of "mistake". In short, to make a mistake is to fail to act on good practical reasons that were epistemically available to you at the time you made your decision. As we shall see, this differs from the views of some influential philosophers. For example, I reject the claim that it is rational to regret a decision you believe to have been the best you could have made, even if that decision has very unwanted consequences. In contrast, the likes of Bernard Williams and Michael Stocker think that regret about such "tragic dilemmas" is both rational and praiseworthy. Thus, I endeavour to show why my account should be preferred to theirs"-- Provided by publisher. |
