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010 a| 2023003782;

020 a| 9780197681084q| (hardback);

020 z| 9780197681091q| (epub);

035 a| (WaSeSS)ssj0002864674;

042 a| pcc;

049 a| EREEa| NEHH;

050 00 a| BC177b| .B476 2023;

082 00 a| 1602| 23/eng/20230331;

100 1 a| Bittner, Rüdiger,d| 1945-=| ^A241065;

245 10 a| Good things to doh| [electronic resource] :b| practical reason without obligation /c| Rüdiger Bittner.;

260 a| New York, NY, United States of America :b| Oxford University Press,c| [2023];

300 a| vi, 213 pages ;c| 22 cm;

504 a| Includes bibliographical references and indexes.;

505 0 a| Practical reason and what we ought to do -- Prudence and what we ought to do -- Morality and what we ought to do -- Practical reason is about good things for somebody to do -- Reasons in favour -- Objections -- How to find out what are good things for one to do.;

506 a| Available only to authorized users.;

520 a| "The book is to show that the aim of thinking about what to do, of practical reason, is to find, not what we ought to do, but what is a good thing to do for us under the circumstances. So it argues, first, that neither under prudence nor under morality there are things we ought to do. There is no warrant for the idea of our being required, by natural law perhaps or by our rationality, to do either what helps us attain our ends or what is right for moral reasons. While common moral understanding is committed to there being things we ought to do and to our being guilty and deserving blame if we fail to do them, we can lay aside these notions without loss, indeed with benefit. Second, it explains what it is for something to be good for somebody to do under the circumstances and argues for understanding practical reason in these terms. What is good for somebody to do we find by experience: from what we go through we learn what helps and what hinders and figure out on this basis both what is prudentially useful and what is morally right to do - although in the end this difference itself gives way, and morality turns out to be a part of prudence"--c| Provided by publisher.;

538 a| Mode of access: World Wide Web;

650 0 a| Practical reason.=| ^A476881;

650 0 a| Ethics.=| ^A116;

650 0 a| Act (Philosophy)=| ^A15309;

655 0 a| Electronic books.=| ^A491897;

710 2 a| Oxford University Press.=| ^A636469;

856 40 z| Full text available from Oxford Scholarship Onlineu| https://go.openathens.net/redirector/ecu.edu?url=https%3A%2F%2Facademic.oup.com%2Fbook%2F46447;

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Good things to do practical reason without obligation / Rüdiger Bittner.

Author/creator	Bittner, Rüdiger, 1945-
Other author	Oxford University Press.
Format	Electronic
Publication Info	New York, NY, United States of America : Oxford University Press, [2023]
Description	vi, 213 pages ; 22 cm
Supplemental Content	Full text available from Oxford Scholarship Online
Subjects	Practical reason. Ethics. Act (Philosophy)

Contents	Practical reason and what we ought to do -- Prudence and what we ought to do -- Morality and what we ought to do -- Practical reason is about good things for somebody to do -- Reasons in favour -- Objections -- How to find out what are good things for one to do.
Abstract	"The book is to show that the aim of thinking about what to do, of practical reason, is to find, not what we ought to do, but what is a good thing to do for us under the circumstances. So it argues, first, that neither under prudence nor under morality there are things we ought to do. There is no warrant for the idea of our being required, by natural law perhaps or by our rationality, to do either what helps us attain our ends or what is right for moral reasons. While common moral understanding is committed to there being things we ought to do and to our being guilty and deserving blame if we fail to do them, we can lay aside these notions without loss, indeed with benefit. Second, it explains what it is for something to be good for somebody to do under the circumstances and argues for understanding practical reason in these terms. What is good for somebody to do we find by experience: from what we go through we learn what helps and what hinders and figure out on this basis both what is prudentially useful and what is morally right to do - although in the end this difference itself gives way, and morality turns out to be a part of prudence"-- Provided by publisher.
Bibliography note	Includes bibliographical references and indexes.
Access restriction	Available only to authorized users.
Technical details	Mode of access: World Wide Web
Genre/form	Electronic books.
LCCN	2023003782
ISBN	9780197681084 (hardback)
ISBN	(epub)

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Good things to do practical reason without obligation / Rüdiger Bittner.

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