Pay-to-bid auctions / Brennan C. Platt, Joseph Price, Henry Tappen.
| Author/creator | Platt, Brennan C. |
| Other author | Price, Joseph. |
| Other author | Tappen, Henry. |
| Other author | National Bureau of Economic Research. |
| Format | Electronic |
| Publication Info | Cambridge, MA : National Bureau of Economic Research, |
| Supplemental Content | Full text available from NBER Working Papers |
| Series | NBER working paper series ; working paper 15695 Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ; working paper no. 15695. UNAUTHORIZED |
| Summary | "We analyze a new auction format in which bidders pay a fee each time they increase the auction price. Bidding fees are the primary source of revenue for the seller, but produce the same expected revenue as standard auctions. Our model predicts a particular distribution of ending prices, which we test against observed auction data. Our model fits the data well for over three-fourths of routinely auctioned items. The notable exceptions are video game paraphernalia, which show more aggressive bidding and higher expected revenue. By incorporating mild risk-loving preferences in the model, we explain nearly all of the auctions"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site. |
| General note | Title from PDF file as viewed on 3/9/2010. |
| Bibliography note | Includes bibliographical references. |
| Access restriction | Available only to authorized users. |
| Other forms | Also available in print. |
| Technical details | Mode of access: World Wide Web |
| Genre/form | Electronic books. |
| LCCN | 2010655714 |
Availability
| Library | Location | Call Number | Status | Item Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Electronic Resources | Access Content Online | ✔ Available |