A behavioral model of demandable deposits and its implications for financial regulation / Julio J. Rotemberg.
| Author/creator | Rotemberg, Julio J. |
| Other author | National Bureau of Economic Research. |
| Format | Electronic |
| Publication Info | Cambridge, MA : National Bureau of Economic Research, |
| Supplemental Content | Full text available from NBER Working Papers |
| Series | NBER working paper series ; working paper 16620 Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ; working paper no. 16620. UNAUTHORIZED |
| Summary | "A model is developed which rationalizes contracts that give depositors the right to obtain funds on demand even when depositors intend to use these funds for consumption in the future. This is explained by depositor overoptimism regarding their own ability to collect funds in a run. Capitalized institutions serving depositors with such beliefs emerge in equilibrium even if depositors and bank owners have the same preferences and the same investment opportunities. Various government regulations of these institutions, including minimum capital levels, requirements concerning the assets they may hold, deposit insurance and compulsory clawbacks in bankruptcy can raise the average ex post welfare of depositors"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site. |
| General note | Title from PDF file as viewed on 4/5/2011. |
| Bibliography note | Includes bibliographical references. |
| Access restriction | Available only to authorized users. |
| Other forms | Also available in print. |
| Technical details | Mode of access: World Wide Web |
| Genre/form | Electronic books. |
| LCCN | 2011655862 |
Availability
| Library | Location | Call Number | Status | Item Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Electronic Resources | Access Content Online | ✔ Available |