Bargaining around the hearth / Robert A. Pollak.

Author/creator Pollak, Robert A., 1938-
Other author National Bureau of Economic Research.
Format Electronic
Publication InfoCambridge, MA : National Bureau of Economic Research,
Supplemental ContentFull text available from NBER Working Papers

SeriesNBER working paper series ; working paper 13142
Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ; working paper no. 13142. UNAUTHORIZED
Summary "In "Unpacking the Household: Informal Property Rights Around the Hearth" (Yale Law Journal, 2006) Robert Ellickson argues that as long as members of a household expect their relationship to continue, norms, rather than law, will determine allocations among them. More specifically, Ellickson argues that in "midgame" household members either ignore the "endgame" completely or, if they do take endgame considerations into account, the relevant endgame considerations are determined by norms rather than by law. This paper examines the fit between Ellickson's claims and four bargaining models that economists have used to understand interactions within household and families"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
General noteTitle from PDF file as viewed on 7/25/2007.
Bibliography noteIncludes bibliographical references.
Access restrictionAvailable only to authorized users.
Other formsAlso available in print.
Technical detailsMode of access: World Wide Web
Genre/formElectronic books.
LCCN 2007616297

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