Asymmetric information and the demand for voluntary health insurance in Europe / Kristian Bolin, Daniel Hedblom, Anna Lindgren, Bjorn Lindgren.

Other author Bolin, Kristian.
Other author National Bureau of Economic Research.
Format Electronic
Publication InfoCambridge, MA : National Bureau of Economic Research,
Supplemental ContentFull text available from NBER Working Papers

SeriesNBER working paper series ; working paper 15689
Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ; working paper no. 15689. UNAUTHORIZED
Summary "The NBER Bulletin on Aging and Health provides summaries of publications like this. You can sign up to receive the NBER Bulletin on Aging and Health by email. Several past studies have found health risk to be negatively correlated with the probability of voluntary health insurance. This is contrary to what one would expect from standard textbook models of adverse selection and moral hazard. The two most common explanations to the counter-intuitive result are either (1) that risk-aversion is correlated with health - i.e. that healthier individuals are also more risk-averse - or (2) that insurers are able to discriminate among customers based on observable health-risk characteristics. We revisited these arguments, using data from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE). Self-assessed health served as an indicator of risk: better health, lower risk. We did, indeed, observe a negative correlation between risk and insurance but found no evidence of heterogeneous risk-preferences as an explanation to our finding"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
General noteTitle from PDF file as viewed on 3/2/2010.
Bibliography noteIncludes bibliographical references.
Access restrictionAvailable only to authorized users.
Other formsAlso available in print.
Technical detailsMode of access: World Wide Web
Genre/formElectronic books.
LCCN 2010655708

Availability

Library Location Call Number Status Item Actions
Electronic Resources Access Content Online ✔ Available