Agency costs, mispricing, and ownership structure / Sergey Chernenko, C. Fritz Foley, Robin Greenwood.
| Author/creator | Chernenko, Sergey V. |
| Other author | Foley, C. Fritz. |
| Other author | Greenwood, Robin. |
| Other author | National Bureau of Economic Research. |
| Format | Electronic |
| Publication Info | Cambridge, MA : National Bureau of Economic Research, |
| Supplemental Content | Full text available from NBER Working Papers |
| Series | NBER working paper series ; working paper 15910 Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ; working paper no. 15910. UNAUTHORIZED |
| Summary | "Standard theories of corporate ownership assume that because markets are efficient, insiders ultimately bear agency costs and therefore have a strong incentive to minimize conflicts of interest with outside investors. We show that if equity is overvalued, however, mispricing offsets agency costs and can induce a controlling shareholder to list equity. Higher valuations support listings associated with greater agency costs. We test the predictions that follow from this idea on a sample of publicly listed corporate subsidiaries in Japan. When there is greater scope for expropriation by the parent firm, minority shareholders fare poorly after listing. Parent firms often repurchase subsidiaries at large discounts to valuations at the time of listing and experience positive abnormal returns when repurchases are announced"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site. |
| General note | Title from PDF file as viewed on 4/22/2010. |
| Bibliography note | Includes bibliographical references. |
| Access restriction | Available only to authorized users. |
| Other forms | Also available in print. |
| Technical details | Mode of access: World Wide Web |
| Genre/form | Electronic books. |
| LCCN | 2010655956 |
Availability
| Library | Location | Call Number | Status | Item Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Electronic Resources | Access Content Online | ✔ Available |