Agency conflicts, investment, and asset pricing / Rui Albuquerque, Neng Wang.
| Author/creator | Albuquerque, Rui |
| Other author | Wang, Neng. |
| Other author | National Bureau of Economic Research. |
| Format | Electronic |
| Publication Info | Cambridge, MA : National Bureau of Economic Research, |
| Supplemental Content | Full text available from NBER Working Papers |
| Series | NBER working paper series ; working paper 13251 Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ; working paper no. 13251. UNAUTHORIZED |
| Summary | "The separation of ownership and control allows controlling shareholders to pursue private benefits. We develop an analytically tractable dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to study asset pricing and welfare implications of imperfect investor protection. Consistent with empirical evidence, the model predicts that countries with weaker investor protection have more incentives to overinvest, lower Tobin's q, higher return volatility, larger risk premium, and higher interest rate. Calibrating the model to the Korean economy reveals that perfecting investor protection increases the stock market's value by 22 percent, a gain for which outside shareholders are willing to pay 11 percent of their capital stock"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site. |
| General note | Title from PDF file as viewed on 8/13/2007. |
| Bibliography note | Includes bibliographical references. |
| Access restriction | Available only to authorized users. |
| Other forms | Also available in print. |
| Technical details | Mode of access: World Wide Web |
| Genre/form | Electronic books. |
| LCCN | 2007616396 |
Availability
| Library | Location | Call Number | Status | Item Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Electronic Resources | Access Content Online | ✔ Available |