$100 bills on the sidewalk suboptimal saving in 401(k) plans / James J. Choi, David Laibson, Brigitte C. Madrian.
| Author/creator | Choi, James J. |
| Other author | Laibson, David I. |
| Other author | Madrian, Brigitte C. (Brigitte Condie) |
| Other author | National Bureau of Economic Research. |
| Format | Electronic |
| Publication Info | Cambridge, MA : National Bureau of Economic Research, |
| Supplemental Content | Full text available from NBER Working Papers |
| Subjects |
| Variant title | One hundred dollar bills on the sidewalk |
| Series | NBER working paper series ; working paper 11554 Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ; working paper no. 11554. UNAUTHORIZED |
| Summary | "It is typically difficult to determine whether households save optimally. But in some cases, savings incentives are strong enough to imply sharp normative restrictions. We consider employees who receive employer matching contributions in their 401(k) plan and are allowed to make discretionary, penalty-free, in-service withdrawals. For these employees, contributing below the match threshold is a dominated action. Nevertheless, half of employees with these clear-cut incentives do contribute below the match threshold, foregoing matching contributions that average 1.3% of their annual pay. Providing these "undersavers" with specific information about the free lunch they are giving up fails to raise their contribution rates"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site. |
| General note | Title from PDF file as viewed on 8/25/2005. |
| Bibliography note | Includes bibliographical references. |
| Access restriction | Available only to authorized users. |
| Other forms | Also available in print. |
| Technical details | Mode of access: World Wide Web |
| Genre/form | Electronic books. |
| LCCN | 2005619198 |
Availability
| Library | Location | Call Number | Status | Item Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Electronic Resources | Access Content Online | ✔ Available |