Meaning and Mental Representation

Author/creator Cummins, Robert Author
Format Electronic
EditionReprint
Publication InfoCambridge : MIT Press
Description192 p. ill 08.000 x 03.400 in.
Supplemental ContentFull text available from eBooks on EBSCOhost
Subjects

Summary Annotation In this provocative study, Robert Cummins takes on philosophers, both old and new, who pursue the question of mental representation as an abstraction, apart from the constraints of any particular theory or framework. Cummins asserts that mental representation is, in fact, a problem in the philosophy of science, a theoretical assumption that serves different explanatory roles within the different contexts of commonsense or "folk" psychology, orthodox computation, connectionism, or neuroscience.<br /><br />Cummins looks at existing and traditional accounts by Locke, Fodor, Dretske, Millikan, and others of the nature of mental representation and evaluates these accounts within the context of orthodox computational theories of cognition. He proposes that popular accounts of mental representation are inconsistent with the empirical assumptions of these models, which require an account of representation like that involved in mathematical modeling. In the final chapter he considers how mental representation might look in a connectionist context.<br /><br />A Bradford Book.
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Technical detailsMode of access: World Wide Web
Genre/formElectronic books.
ISBN9780262530965
ISBN0262530961 (Trade Paper) Out of Stock Indefinitely
Standard identifier# 9780262530965
Stock number00015994

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