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001 ocm70219144;

003 OCoLC;

005 20210319080609.0;

006 m o d f ;

007 cr m|||||a||||;

008 060630s2005 dcua ob f000 0 eng c;

035 a| (Sirsi) o70219144;

042 a| pcc;

043 a| n-us---;

049 a| ERE#;

050 4 a| TK5105.59b| .I57 2005 Online;

074 a| 0520-L (online);

086 0 a| HS 9.2:IN 7/2z| HS 9.2:IN 7;

100 1 a| Keeney, Michelle,e| author.=| ^A1412245;

245 10 a| Insider threat study :b| computer system sabotage in critical infrastructure sectors /c| Michelle Keeney [and six others].;

246 30 a| Computer system sabotage in critical infrastructure sectors;

264 1 a| Washington, DC :b| United States Secret Service,c| 2005.;

300 a| 1 online resource (45 pages);

336 a| textb| txt2| rdacontent;

337 a| computerb| c2| rdamedia;

338 a| online resourceb| cr2| rdacarrier;

500 a| "May 2005.";

500 a| GPO Cataloging Record Distribution Program (CRDP).;

504 a| Includes bibliographical references.;

505 0 a| Introduction -- Prevalence of incidents of insider sabotage -- The insider threat study -- Characteristics of insider sabotage across critical infrastructure sectors -- Insider characteristics -- Organization characteristics -- Consequences to insiders -- Key findings of the insider threat study of sabotage across critical infrastructure sectors -- The insider's motive -- Pre-attack behavior and planning -- Advancing the attack -- Detecting the attack -- Consequences for targeted organizations -- Implications of the key findings for the prevention of insider sabotage -- The insider's motive -- Pre-attack behavior and planning -- Advancing the attack -- Detecting the attack -- Consequences for target organizations -- Conclusion: Reflections on the findings for the prevention of insider sabotage.;

520 a| A new report from the Secret Service and the Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute's CERT found that most acts of insider sabotage on computer systems in critical infrastructure sectors were perpetrated by former employees--motivated at least in part by a desire to seek revenge--who were granted system administrator or privileged access when hired.;

588 a| Description based on online resource; title from PDF cover (Secret Service website, viewed Feb. 9, 2021).;

650 0 a| Computer networksx| Security measuresz| United States.=| ^A425096;

650 0 a| Law enforcementz| United States.=| ^A905;

650 7 a| Computer networksx| Security measures.2| fast0| (OCoLC)fst00872341;

650 7 a| Law enforcement.2| fast0| (OCoLC)fst00993931;

651 7 a| United States.2| fast0| (OCoLC)fst01204155?| UNAUTHORIZED;

710 1 a| United States.b| Secret Service,e| issuing body.=| ^A38714;

856 40 u| https://purl.fdlp.gov/GPO/gpo151346;

922 a| BIBCONEW;

949 a| Click on web addressw| asish| joyner94;

596 a| 1;

998 a| 5569365;

999 a| CLICK ON WEB ADDRESSw| ASISc| 1i| 5569365-1001l| JNETm| JOYNERr| Ys| Yt| JNE1DOu| 3/12/2021x| EDOCUMENTz| JERESOURCE;

Insider threat study : computer system sabotage in critical infrastructure sectors / Michelle Keeney [and six others].

Author/creator	Keeney, Michelle author.
Other author	United States. Secret Service, issuing body.
Format	Electronic
Publication	Washington, DC : United States Secret Service, 2005.
Description	1 online resource (45 pages)
Supplemental Content	https://purl.fdlp.gov/GPO/gpo151346
Subjects	Computer networks--Security measures. --United States. Law enforcement--United States.

Portion of title	Computer system sabotage in critical infrastructure sectors
Contents	Introduction -- Prevalence of incidents of insider sabotage -- The insider threat study -- Characteristics of insider sabotage across critical infrastructure sectors -- Insider characteristics -- Organization characteristics -- Consequences to insiders -- Key findings of the insider threat study of sabotage across critical infrastructure sectors -- The insider's motive -- Pre-attack behavior and planning -- Advancing the attack -- Detecting the attack -- Consequences for targeted organizations -- Implications of the key findings for the prevention of insider sabotage -- The insider's motive -- Pre-attack behavior and planning -- Advancing the attack -- Detecting the attack -- Consequences for target organizations -- Conclusion: Reflections on the findings for the prevention of insider sabotage.
Abstract	A new report from the Secret Service and the Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute's CERT found that most acts of insider sabotage on computer systems in critical infrastructure sectors were perpetrated by former employees--motivated at least in part by a desire to seek revenge--who were granted system administrator or privileged access when hired.
General note	"May 2005."
General note	GPO Cataloging Record Distribution Program (CRDP).
Bibliography note	Includes bibliographical references.
Source of description	Description based on online resource; title from PDF cover (Secret Service website, viewed Feb. 9, 2021).
GPO item number	0520-L (online)
Govt. docs number	HS 9.2:IN 7/2 HS 9.2:IN 7

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Insider threat study : computer system sabotage in critical infrastructure sectors / Michelle Keeney [and six others].

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