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010 a| 2019941386;

020 a| 9780198793366q| hardcover;

020 a| 9780192855336q| paperback;

020 z| 9780191884122q| electronic book;

035 a| (WaSeSS)ssj0002255037;

042 a| lccopycat;

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082 04 a| 323.012| 23;

100 1 a| Cruft, Rowan.=| ^A1387652;

245 10 a| Human rights, ownership, and the individualh| [electronic resource] /c| Rowan Cruft.;

250 a| First edition.;

260 a| Oxford ;a| New York, NY :b| Oxford University Press,c| 2019.;

300 a| ix, 283 pages ;c| 24 cm;

504 a| Includes bibliographical references and index.;

506 a| Available only to authorized users.;

520 8 a| Is it defensible to use the concept of a right? Can we justify this concept's central place in modern moral and legal thinking, or does it unjustifiably side-line those who do not qualify as right-holders? Rowan Cruft brings together a new account of the concept of a right. Moving beyond the traditional 'interest theory' and 'will theory', he defends a distinctive role for the concept: it is appropriate to our thinking about fundamental moral duties springing from the good of the right-holder. This has important implications for the idea of 'natural' moral rights-that is, rights that exist independently of anyone's recognising that they do. Cruft argues that only rights that exist primarily for the sake of the right-holder can qualify as natural in this sense.0In its relation to property, however, matters are far more complicated because much property is groundable only by common or collective goods beyond the right-holder's own good. For such property, Cruft argues that a non-rights property system-that resembles modern markets but is not conceived in terms of rights-would be preferable. The result of this study is a partial vindication of the rights concept that is more supportive of human rights than many of their critics (from left or right) might expect, and is surprisingly doubtful about property as an individual right.;

538 a| Mode of access: World Wide Web;

650 0 a| Human rightsx| Philosophy.=| ^A204067;

650 0 a| Ethicsx| Philosophy.=| ^A116;

650 0 a| Right of property.=| ^A70047;

650 7 a| Human rights.2| fast0| (OCoLC)fst00963285;

650 7 a| Right of property.2| fast0| (OCoLC)fst01097863;

655 0 a| Electronic books.=| ^A491897;

710 2 a| Oxford University Press.=| ^A636469;

856 40 z| Full text available from Oxford Scholarship Onlineu| https://go.openathens.net/redirector/ecu.edu?url=https%3A%2F%2Facademic.oup.com%2Fbook%2F32306;

947 a| (OCoLC)on1101792366;

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Human rights, ownership, and the individual / Rowan Cruft.

Author/creator	Cruft, Rowan
Other author	Oxford University Press.
Format	Electronic
Edition	First edition.
Publication Info	Oxford ; New York, NY : Oxford University Press, 2019.
Description	ix, 283 pages ; 24 cm
Supplemental Content	Full text available from Oxford Scholarship Online
Subjects	Human rights--Philosophy. Ethics--Philosophy. Right of property.

Summary	Is it defensible to use the concept of a right? Can we justify this concept's central place in modern moral and legal thinking, or does it unjustifiably side-line those who do not qualify as right-holders? Rowan Cruft brings together a new account of the concept of a right. Moving beyond the traditional 'interest theory' and 'will theory', he defends a distinctive role for the concept: it is appropriate to our thinking about fundamental moral duties springing from the good of the right-holder. This has important implications for the idea of 'natural' moral rights-that is, rights that exist independently of anyone's recognising that they do. Cruft argues that only rights that exist primarily for the sake of the right-holder can qualify as natural in this sense.0In its relation to property, however, matters are far more complicated because much property is groundable only by common or collective goods beyond the right-holder's own good. For such property, Cruft argues that a non-rights property system-that resembles modern markets but is not conceived in terms of rights-would be preferable. The result of this study is a partial vindication of the rights concept that is more supportive of human rights than many of their critics (from left or right) might expect, and is surprisingly doubtful about property as an individual right.
Bibliography note	Includes bibliographical references and index.
Access restriction	Available only to authorized users.
Technical details	Mode of access: World Wide Web
Genre/form	Electronic books.
LCCN	2019941386
ISBN	9780198793366 hardcover
ISBN	9780192855336 paperback
ISBN	electronic book

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Human rights, ownership, and the individual / Rowan Cruft.

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