ECU Libraries Catalog

Above politics : bureaucratic discretion and credible commitment / Gary J. Miller, Washington University in St. Louis; Andrew B. Whitford, University of Georgia.

Author/creator Miller, Gary J. author.
Other author/creatorWhitford, Andrew B., author.
Format Book and Print
Publication Info New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, 2016.
Descriptionxii, 271 pages ; 23 cm.
Subject(s)
Series Political economy of institutions and decisions
Political economy of institutions and decisions. ^A235831
Contents The moral hazard of bureaucrats and politicians -- Political moral hazard and credible commitment -- Political moral hazard and bureaucratic autonomy -- 'Above politics': the separation of powers and bureaucratic autonomy -- The control paradox, trust, and leadership -- Professionalism and credible commitment -- The politicization of financial regulation -- The financial crisis and reregulation.
Abstract "Economic development requires secure contract enforcement and stable property rights. Normal majority-rule politics, such as bargaining over distributive and monetary policies, generate instability and frequently undermine economic development. Above Politics argues that bureaucracies can contribute to stability and economic development, but only if they are insulated from unstable politics. A separation-of-powers stalemate creates the conditions for bureaucratic autonomy. But what keeps delegated bureaucrats from being more abusive as they become more autonomous? One answer is the negotiation of long-term, cooperative relationships - that (when successful) typically bind subordinates to provide more effort in exchange for autonomy. Even more compelling is professionalism, which embeds its professional practitioners in professional norms and culture, and incidentally mitigates corruption. Financial examples are provided throughout the book, which ends with an analysis of the role played by professionalized bureaucracies during the Great Recession"-- Provided by publisher.
Abstract "Above Politics argues that bureaucracies can contribute to stability and economic development, but only if they are insulated from unstable politics. A separation-of-powers stalemate creates the conditions for bureaucratic autonomy. But what keeps delegated bureaucrats from being more abusive as they become more autonomous? One answer is the negotiation of long-term, cooperative relationships - that (when successful) typically bind subordinates to provide more effort in exchange for autonomy"-- Provided by publisher.
Bibliography noteIncludes bibliographical references (pages 239-260) and index.
LCCN 2015039155
ISBN9781107008755 (hardback)
ISBN1107008751 (hardback)
ISBN9781107401310 (paperback)
ISBN1107401313 (paperback)

Available Items

Library Location Call Number Status Item Actions
Joyner General Stacks JK421 .M458 2016 ✔ Available Place Hold

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