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020 a| 9781475576627;

020 a| 1475576625 (E-Book)c| USD 18.00 Retail Price (Publisher)9| Active Record;

035 a| (WaSeSS)ssj0000942157;

037 b| 00013468;

040 a| BIP USd| WaSeSS;

049 a| EREEa| NEHH;

100 1 a| Bianchi, Javiere| Author?| UNAUTHORIZED;

245 10 a| Macro-Prudential Policy in a Fisherian Model of Financial Innovationh| [electronic resource];

260 a| Washington : b| International Monetary Fund;

300 a| 58 p.;

506 a| Available only to authorized users.;

520 8 a| Annotationb| The interaction between credit frictions, financial innovation, and a switch from optimistic to pessimistic beliefs played a central role in the 2008 financial crisis. This paper develops a quantitative general equilibrium framework in which this interaction drives the financial amplification mechanism to study the effects of macro-prudential policy. Financial innovation enhances the ability of agents to collateralize assets into debt, but the riskiness of this new regime can only be learned over time. Beliefs about transition probabilities across states with high and low ability to borrow change as agents learn from observed realizations of financial conditions. At the same time, the collateral constraint introduces a pecuniary externality, because agents fail to internalize the effect of their borrowing decisions on asset prices. Quantitative analysis shows that the effectiveness of macro-prudential policy in this environment depends on the government's information set, the tightness of credit constraints and the pace at which optimism surges in the early stages of financial innovation. the policy is least effective when the government is as uninformed as private agents, credit constraints are tight, and optimism builds quickly.;

538 a| Mode of access: World Wide Web;

655 0 a| Electronic books.=| ^A491897;

700 1 a| Boz, Eminee| Author?| UNAUTHORIZED;

700 1 a| Mendoza, Enrique G.e| Author?| UNAUTHORIZED;

856 40 z| Full text available from Ebook Central - Academic Completeu| https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/eastcarolina/detail.action?docID=1606843;

949 a| CLICK ON WEB ADDRESSw| ASISh| JOYNER188;

949 a| CLICK ON WEB ADDRESSw| ASISh| HSL77;

949 a| CLICK ON WEB ADDRESSw| ASISh| JMUSIC60;

596 a| 1 3 4;

998 a| 4673827;

999 a| CLICK ON WEB ADDRESSw| ASISc| 1i| 4673827-1001l| JNETm| JOYNERr| Ys| Yt| JNESSBKu| 3/22/2017x| EBOOKz| JERESOURCE;

999 a| CLICK ON WEB ADDRESSw| ASISc| 1i| 4673827-2001l| HSLELECm| HSLr| Ys| Yt| HEBKu| 3/22/2017x| EBOOKz| HERESOURCE;

999 a| CLICK ON WEB ADDRESSw| ASISc| 1i| 4673827-3001l| MNETm| JMUSICr| Ys| Yt| MNESSBKu| 3/22/2017x| EBOOKz| JERESOURCE;

Macro-Prudential Policy in a Fisherian Model of Financial Innovation

Author/creator	Bianchi, Javier Author
Other author	Boz, Emine Author
Other author	Mendoza, Enrique G. Author
Format	Electronic
Publication Info	Washington : International Monetary Fund
Description	58 p.
Supplemental Content	Full text available from Ebook Central - Academic Complete

Summary	Annotation The interaction between credit frictions, financial innovation, and a switch from optimistic to pessimistic beliefs played a central role in the 2008 financial crisis. This paper develops a quantitative general equilibrium framework in which this interaction drives the financial amplification mechanism to study the effects of macro-prudential policy. Financial innovation enhances the ability of agents to collateralize assets into debt, but the riskiness of this new regime can only be learned over time. Beliefs about transition probabilities across states with high and low ability to borrow change as agents learn from observed realizations of financial conditions. At the same time, the collateral constraint introduces a pecuniary externality, because agents fail to internalize the effect of their borrowing decisions on asset prices. Quantitative analysis shows that the effectiveness of macro-prudential policy in this environment depends on the government's information set, the tightness of credit constraints and the pace at which optimism surges in the early stages of financial innovation. the policy is least effective when the government is as uninformed as private agents, credit constraints are tight, and optimism builds quickly.
Access restriction	Available only to authorized users.
Technical details	Mode of access: World Wide Web
Genre/form	Electronic books.
ISBN	9781475576627
ISBN	1475576625 (E-Book) Active Record
Stock number	00013468

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Macro-Prudential Policy in a Fisherian Model of Financial Innovation

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