Towards a Principal-Agent Based Typology of Risks in Public-Private Partnerships
| Author/creator | Palma, Andr De Author |
| Other author | Prunier, Guillaume Author |
| Other author | Leruth, Luc E. Author |
| Format | Electronic |
| Publication Info | Washington : International Monetary Fund |
| Description | 74 p. |
| Supplemental Content | Full text available from Ebook Central - Academic Complete |
| Summary | Annotation There is a strong economic rationale for close cooperation between the public and private sectors. This has resulted in a significant increase in the demand for the provision of public services through instruments combining public and private money such as public-private partnerships (PPPs or P3s). We describe these arrangements and explore how they can be analyzed using standard tools in economics (incentives and principal-agent theory). We discuss the implications of our approach in terms of identifying risks that are often overlooked before turining to the optimal risk-sharing between the public and private partners, in particular with respect to information asymmetries in risk perceptions. This allows us to propose a typology of the risks associated with PPPs, where both internal risks (the risks associated with the contract) and external risks (those associated with the project) are considered. |
| Access restriction | Available only to authorized users. |
| Technical details | Mode of access: World Wide Web |
| Genre/form | Electronic books. |
| ISBN | 9781451917505 |
| ISBN | 1451917503 (E-Book) Active Record |
| Stock number | 00013468 |
Availability
| Library | Location | Call Number | Status | Item Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Electronic Resources | Access Content Online | ✔ Available |