Goal-Independent Central Banks Why Politicians Decide to Delegate
| Author/creator | Crowe, Christopher W. Author |
| Format | Electronic |
| Publication Info | Washington : International Monetary Fund |
| Description | 6 p. |
| Supplemental Content | Full text available from Ebook Central - Academic Complete |
| Summary | Annotation A motivation for central bank independence (CBI) is that policy delegation helps politicians manage diverse coalitions. This paper develops a model of coalition formation that predicts when delegation will occur. An analysis of policy preferences survey data and CBI indicators supports the predictions. Case studies, drawn from several countries' recent past and the nineteenth-century United States, provide further support. Finally, the model explains why the expected negative relationship between CBI and inflation is not empirically robust: endogenous selection biases the estimated effect towards zero. the data confirm this. |
| Access restriction | Available only to authorized users. |
| Technical details | Mode of access: World Wide Web |
| Genre/form | Electronic books. |
| ISBN | 9781451909692 |
| ISBN | 1451909691 (E-Book) Active Record |
| Stock number | 00013468 |
Availability
| Library | Location | Call Number | Status | Item Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Electronic Resources | Access Content Online | ✔ Available |