Essays on Anscombe's Intention / edited by Anton Ford, Jennifer Hornsby, Frederick Stoutland.

Other author Ford, Anton.
Other author Hornsby, Jennifer.
Other author Stoutland, Frederick.
Format Electronic
Publication InfoCambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press,
Descriptionviii, 313 p. ; 25 cm.
Supplemental ContentFull text available from Ebook Central - Academic Complete
Subjects

Contents Introduction : Anscombe's Intention in context / Frederick Stoutland -- Summary of Anscombe's Intention / Frederick Stoutland -- Anscombe on expression of intention : an exegesis / Richard Moran and Martin J. Stone -- Action and generality / Anton Ford -- Actions in their circumstances / Jennifer Hornsby -- Anscombe on bodily self-knowledge / John McDowell -- The knowledge that a man has of his intentional actions / Adrian Haddock -- Knowledge of intention / Kieran Setiya -- Anscombe's Intention and practical knowledge / Michael Thompson -- Forms of practical knowledge and their unity / Sebastian Rodl -- Backward-looking rationality and the unity of practical reason / Anselm Muller -- An Anscombian approach to collective action / Ben Laurence.
General note"This volume of essays originated in two conferences. The first, in September 2008, was held at the Philosophy Department of the University of Uppsala, sponsored jointly by the five year program Understanding Agency centered in Uppsala, and the Rational Agency section of the Centre for the Study of Mind in Nature at the University of Oslo. The second was a Lipkind conference at the Department of Philosophy, University of Chicago, held in April 2009 in honour of the 50th anniversary of Elizabeth Anscombe's Intention"--Pref.
Bibliography noteIncludes bibliographical references and indexes.
Access restrictionAvailable only to authorized users.
Technical detailsMode of access: World Wide Web
Genre/formElectronic books.
LCCN 2010045536
ISBN9780674051027 (alk. paper)

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