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001 ocn236117268;

003 OCoLC;

005 20141212011837.0;

008 080714s2009 maua b 001 0 eng ;

010 a| 2008030920;

015 a| GBA9008312| bnb;

016 7 a| 0148643272| Uk;

020 a| 9780262012737 (hard cover : alk. paper);

020 a| 0262012731 (hard cover : alk. paper);

035 a| (Sirsi) o236117268;

035 a| (OCoLC)236117268;

049 a| EREE;

050 00 a| B808.9b| .T943 2009;

082 00 a| 1262| 22;

100 1 a| Tye, Michael.=| ^A236756;

245 10 a| Consciousness revisited :b| materialism without phenomenal concepts /c| Michael Tye.;

300 a| xiv, 229 pages :b| illustrations ;c| 24 cm.;

336 a| text2| rdacontent;

337 a| unmediated2| rdamedia;

338 a| volume2| rdacarrier;

490 1 a| Representation and mind;

500 a| "A Bradford book.";

504 a| Includes bibliographical references (p. [217]-225) and index.;

505 0 a| Introduction -- Phenomenal consciousness -- Preliminary remarks -- Phenomenal consciousness and self-representation -- The connection between phenomenal consciousness and creature consciousness -- Consciousness of things -- Real-world puzzle cases -- Why consciousness cannot be physical and why it must be -- What is the thesis of physicalism? -- Why consciousness cannot be physical -- Why consciousness must be physical -- Physicalism and the appeal to phenomenal concepts -- Some terminological points -- Why physicalists appeal to phenomenal concepts -- Various accounts of phenomenal concepts -- My earlier view on phenomenal concepts -- Are there any phenomenal concepts? -- Phenomenal concepts and Burgean intuitions -- Consequences for a priori physicalism -- The admissible contents of visual experience -- The existential thesis -- The singular (when filled) thesis -- Kaplanianism -- The multiple-contents thesis -- The existential thesis revisited -- Still more on existential contents -- Conclusion -- Consciousness, seeing and knowing -- Knowing things and knowing facts -- Nonconceptual content -- Why the phenomenal character of an experience is not one of its nonrepresentational properties -- Phenomenal character and representational content, part I -- Phenomenal character and representational content, part II -- Phenomenal character and our knowledge of it -- Solving the puzzles -- Mary, Mary, how does your knowledge grow? -- The explanatory gap -- The hard problem -- The possibility of zombies -- Change blindness and the refrigerator light illusion -- A closer look at the change-blindness hypotheses -- The "no-see-um" view -- Sperling and the refrigerator light -- Phenomenology and cognitive accessibility -- A further change-blindness experiment -- Another brick in the wall -- Privileged access, phenomenal character, and externalism -- The threat to privileged access -- A Burgean thought experiment -- Social externalism for phenomenal character? -- A closer look at privileged access and incorrigibility -- How do I know that I am not a zombie? -- Phenomenal externalism.;

650 0 a| Consciousness.=| ^A4987;

650 0 a| Phenomenology.=| ^A13419;

650 0 a| Materialism.=| ^A15576;

830 0 a| Representation and mind.=| ^A281050;

994 a| 92b| ERE;

910 a| PromptCat;

938 a| Baker and Taylorb| BTCPn| BK0007971232;

938 a| YBP Library Servicesb| YANKn| 2910494;

938 a| Coutts Information Servicesb| COUTn| 8580714c| 0.00;

980 a| 2009-01-28b| 35d| 0e| 29.4f| 614525g| 30372013971699h| 40016291262i| B 808.9 .T943 2009;

596 a| 1;

998 a| 1452037;

999 a| B808.9 .T943 2009w| LCc| 1i| 30372013971699d| 8/26/2011e| 8/10/2011l| JGESm| JOYNERn| 1r| Ys| Yt| JGESBKu| 2/5/2009x| BOOKz| JSTACKSo| .STAFF. 0;

Consciousness revisited : materialism without phenomenal concepts / Michael Tye.

Author/creator	Tye, Michael
Format	Book
Publication Info	Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, ©2009.
Description	xiv, 229 pages : illustrations ; 24 cm.
Subjects	Consciousness. Phenomenology. Materialism.

Series	Representation and mind Representation and mind. ^A281050
Contents	Introduction -- Phenomenal consciousness -- Preliminary remarks -- Phenomenal consciousness and self-representation -- The connection between phenomenal consciousness and creature consciousness -- Consciousness of things -- Real-world puzzle cases -- Why consciousness cannot be physical and why it must be -- What is the thesis of physicalism? -- Why consciousness cannot be physical -- Why consciousness must be physical -- Physicalism and the appeal to phenomenal concepts -- Some terminological points -- Why physicalists appeal to phenomenal concepts -- Various accounts of phenomenal concepts -- My earlier view on phenomenal concepts -- Are there any phenomenal concepts? -- Phenomenal concepts and Burgean intuitions -- Consequences for a priori physicalism -- The admissible contents of visual experience -- The existential thesis -- The singular (when filled) thesis -- Kaplanianism -- The multiple-contents thesis -- The existential thesis revisited -- Still more on existential contents -- Conclusion -- Consciousness, seeing and knowing -- Knowing things and knowing facts -- Nonconceptual content -- Why the phenomenal character of an experience is not one of its nonrepresentational properties -- Phenomenal character and representational content, part I -- Phenomenal character and representational content, part II -- Phenomenal character and our knowledge of it -- Solving the puzzles -- Mary, Mary, how does your knowledge grow? -- The explanatory gap -- The hard problem -- The possibility of zombies -- Change blindness and the refrigerator light illusion -- A closer look at the change-blindness hypotheses -- The "no-see-um" view -- Sperling and the refrigerator light -- Phenomenology and cognitive accessibility -- A further change-blindness experiment -- Another brick in the wall -- Privileged access, phenomenal character, and externalism -- The threat to privileged access -- A Burgean thought experiment -- Social externalism for phenomenal character? -- A closer look at privileged access and incorrigibility -- How do I know that I am not a zombie? -- Phenomenal externalism.
General note	"A Bradford book."
Bibliography note	Includes bibliographical references (p. [217]-225) and index.
LCCN	2008030920
ISBN	9780262012737 (hard cover : alk. paper)
ISBN	0262012731 (hard cover : alk. paper)

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Consciousness revisited : materialism without phenomenal concepts / Michael Tye.

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