| Contents |
Introduction : theories of democratic accountability and development in Brazil and Venezuela -- The voter's dilemma : collective or clientelistic goods? -- Are voters in Brazil and Venezuela opting for policy-based or quid pro quo voting? -- Party behavior : policy-based or quid pro quo appeals to voters? -- Internal party organization : align individual and collective goals to build a policy reputation or to ensure efficient vote buying? -- Legislative organization : governing majority agenda control or mutual veto? -- Policy choice : generate sustained growth or maximize quid pro quo?. |
| Abstract |
"Presents evidence that under certain widespread structural conditions, democratic accountability falls prey to the same N-person prisoner's dilemma that plagues any other decentralized attempt to procure collective goods. Examines four prominent democracies: postwar and contemporary Brazil and pre-Chavez and contemporary Venezuela"--Provided by publisher. |
| Bibliography note | Includes bibliographical references (p. [273]-288) and index. |
| LCCN | 2008012391 |
| ISBN | 9780271033860 (cloth : alk. paper) |
| ISBN | 027103386X (cloth : alk. paper) |
