Is it always optimal to "sell the firm" to risk-neutral agent? / Christopher P. Adams.

Author/creator Adams, Christopher P.
Other author United States. Federal Trade Commission. Bureau of Economics.
Format Electronic
Publication Info[Washington, D.C. : Bureau of Economics, U.S. Federal Trade Commission, 2004]
Description23 p. : digital, PDF file
Supplemental Contenthttps://purl.fdlp.gov/GPO/LPS95432
Subjects

SeriesWorking paper ; no. 268
Working paper (United States. Federal Trade Commission. Bureau of Economics) ; no. 268. ^A696058
General noteTitle from title screen (viewed on June 13, 2008).
General note"February 17, 2004."
General noteGPO Cataloging Record Distribution Program (CRDP).
Technical detailsMode of access: Internet from the FTC web site. Address as of 6/13/08: http://www.ftc.gov/be/workpapers/wp268.pdf; current access available via PURL.
Issued in other formAdams, Christopher P. Is it always optimal to "sell the firm" to risk-neutral agent? 23 p.
GPO item number0535-A-10 (online)
Govt. docs number FT 1.37/2:268

Availability

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