Tools

LEADER 04273cam a2200493 a 4500

001 ocn173480601;

003 OCoLC;

005 20141212004218.0;

008 070924s2008 enka b 001 0 eng ;

010 a| 2007039559;

015 a| GBA7858562| bnb;

016 7 a| 0141994532| Uk;

019 a| 176819405;

020 a| 9780199239443 (alk. paper);

020 a| 0199239444 (alk. paper);

029 1 a| NLGGCb| 309409241;

035 a| (Sirsi) o173480601;

035 a| (OCoLC)173480601;

049 a| EREE;

050 00 a| BD181.5b| .P43 2008;

082 00 a| 121/.42| 22;

100 1 a| Peacocke, Christopher.=| ^A119954;

245 10 a| Truly understood /c| Christopher Peacocke.;

260 a| Oxford ;a| New York :b| Oxford University Press,c| 2008.;

300 a| xiii, 341 pages :b| illustrations ;c| 24 cm;

336 a| text2| rdacontent;

337 a| unmediated2| rdamedia;

338 a| volume2| rdacarrier;

504 a| Includes bibliographical references (p. [321]-330) and index.;

505 0 a| A theory of understanding -- Truth's role in understanding -- Critique of justificationist and evidential accounts -- Do pragmatist views avoid this critique? -- A realistic account -- How evidence and truth are related -- Three grades of involvement of truth in theories of understanding -- Anchoring -- Next steps -- Reference and reasons -- The main thesis and its location -- Exposition and four argument-types -- Significance and consequences of the main thesis -- The first person as a case study -- Fully self-conscious thought -- Immunity to error through misidentification relative to the first person -- Can a use of the first-person concept fail to refer? -- Some conceptual roles are distinctive but not fundamental -- Implicit conceptions -- Implicit conceptions : motivation and examples -- Deflationary readings rejected -- The phenomenon of new principles -- Explanation by implicit conceptions -- Rationalist aspects -- Consequences : rationality, justification, understanding -- Transitional -- Applications to mental concepts -- Conceiving of conscious states -- Understanding and identity in other cases -- Constraints on legitimate explanations in terms of identity -- Why is the subjective case different? -- Attractions of the interlocking account -- Tacit knowledge, and externalism about the internal -- Is this the myth of the given? -- Knowledge of others' conscious states -- Communicability : between Frege and Wittgenstein -- Conclusions and significance -- 'Another I' : representing perception and action -- The core rule -- Modal status and its significance -- Comparisons -- The possession-condition and some empirical phenomena -- The model generalized -- Wider issues -- Mental action -- The distinctive features of action-awareness -- The nature and range of mental actions -- The principal hypothesis and its grounds -- The principal hypothesis : distinctions and consequences -- How do we know about our own mental actions? -- Concepts of mental actions and their epistemological significance -- Is this account open to the same objections as perceptual models of introspection? -- Characterizing and unifying schizophrenic experience -- The first person in the self-ascription of action -- Rational agency and action-awareness -- Representing thoughts -- The puzzle -- A proposal -- How the solution treats the constraints that generate the puzzle -- Relation to single-level treatments -- An application : reconciling externalism with distinctive self-knowledge.;

650 0 a| Comprehension (Theory of knowledge)=| ^A157144;

650 0 a| Truth.=| ^A16694;

650 0 a| Reference (Philosophy)=| ^A75350;

994 a| 92b| ERE;

910 a| PromptCat;

938 a| Baker & Taylorb| BKTYc| 60.00d| 60.00i| 0199239444n| 0007557998s| active;

938 a| YBP Library Servicesb| YANKn| 100483967;

938 a| Blackwell Book Serviceb| BBUSn| R5716240c| $60.00;

938 a| Baker and Taylorb| BTCPn| BK0007557998;

980 a| 2008-06-24b| 60d| 0e| 50.4f| 448963g| 30372014017468h| 40015551324i| BD 181.5 .P43 2008;

596 a| 1;

998 a| 1389159;

999 a| BD181.5 .P43 2008w| LCc| 1i| 30372014017468d| 11/12/2008e| 9/19/2008l| JGESm| JOYNERn| 1r| Ys| Yt| JGESBKu| 7/7/2008x| BOOKz| JSTACKSo| .STAFF. 0;

Truly understood / Christopher Peacocke.

Author/creator	Peacocke, Christopher
Format	Book
Publication Info	Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2008.
Description	xiii, 341 pages : illustrations ; 24 cm
Subjects	Comprehension (Theory of knowledge) Truth. Reference (Philosophy)

Contents	A theory of understanding -- Truth's role in understanding -- Critique of justificationist and evidential accounts -- Do pragmatist views avoid this critique? -- A realistic account -- How evidence and truth are related -- Three grades of involvement of truth in theories of understanding -- Anchoring -- Next steps -- Reference and reasons -- The main thesis and its location -- Exposition and four argument-types -- Significance and consequences of the main thesis -- The first person as a case study -- Fully self-conscious thought -- Immunity to error through misidentification relative to the first person -- Can a use of the first-person concept fail to refer? -- Some conceptual roles are distinctive but not fundamental -- Implicit conceptions -- Implicit conceptions : motivation and examples -- Deflationary readings rejected -- The phenomenon of new principles -- Explanation by implicit conceptions -- Rationalist aspects -- Consequences : rationality, justification, understanding -- Transitional -- Applications to mental concepts -- Conceiving of conscious states -- Understanding and identity in other cases -- Constraints on legitimate explanations in terms of identity -- Why is the subjective case different? -- Attractions of the interlocking account -- Tacit knowledge, and externalism about the internal -- Is this the myth of the given? -- Knowledge of others' conscious states -- Communicability : between Frege and Wittgenstein -- Conclusions and significance -- 'Another I' : representing perception and action -- The core rule -- Modal status and its significance -- Comparisons -- The possession-condition and some empirical phenomena -- The model generalized -- Wider issues -- Mental action -- The distinctive features of action-awareness -- The nature and range of mental actions -- The principal hypothesis and its grounds -- The principal hypothesis : distinctions and consequences -- How do we know about our own mental actions? -- Concepts of mental actions and their epistemological significance -- Is this account open to the same objections as perceptual models of introspection? -- Characterizing and unifying schizophrenic experience -- The first person in the self-ascription of action -- Rational agency and action-awareness -- Representing thoughts -- The puzzle -- A proposal -- How the solution treats the constraints that generate the puzzle -- Relation to single-level treatments -- An application : reconciling externalism with distinctive self-knowledge.
Bibliography note	Includes bibliographical references (p. [321]-330) and index.
LCCN	2007039559
ISBN	9780199239443 (alk. paper)
ISBN	0199239444 (alk. paper)

Availability

Library	Location	Call Number	Status	Item Actions
Joyner	General Stacks	BD181.5 .P43 2008	✔ Available	Place Hold

Truly understood / Christopher Peacocke.

Click here for more information about this title

Availability