Statutory default rules : how to interpret unclear legislation / Einer Elhauge.
| Author/creator | Elhauge, Einer |
| Format | Book |
| Publication Info | Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 2008. |
| Description | vi, 386 pages ; 25 cm |
| Supplemental Content | Table of contents only |
| Subjects |
| Contents | Why courts should maximize enactable preferences when statutes are unclear -- The general theory for current preferences default rules -- Inferring current preferences from recent legislative action -- Inferring current preferences from agency action -- From legislative intent to probabilistic estimates of enactable preferences -- Moderation, unforeseen circumstances, and a theory of meaning -- Eliciting legislative preferences -- Canons favoring the politically powerless -- Linguistic canons of statutory construction -- Interpretations that may create international conflict -- Explaining seeming inconsistencies in statutory stare decisis -- Tracking the preferences of political subunits -- Tracking high court preferences -- The fit with prior political science models and empirical data -- Interest group and collective choice theory -- Protecting reliance or avoiding change or effect -- Rebutting operational and jurisprudential objections. |
| Bibliography note | Includes bibliographical references (p. 337-380) and index. |
| LCCN | 2007014164 |
| ISBN | 9780674024601 (alk. paper) |
| ISBN | 0674024605 (alk. paper) |
Availability
| Library | Location | Call Number | Status | Item Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Joyner | General Stacks | KF 425 .E44 2008 | ✔ Available | Place Hold |