Statutory default rules : how to interpret unclear legislation / Einer Elhauge.

Author/creator Elhauge, Einer
Format Book
Publication InfoCambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 2008.
Descriptionvi, 386 pages ; 25 cm
Supplemental ContentTable of contents only
Subjects

Contents Why courts should maximize enactable preferences when statutes are unclear -- The general theory for current preferences default rules -- Inferring current preferences from recent legislative action -- Inferring current preferences from agency action -- From legislative intent to probabilistic estimates of enactable preferences -- Moderation, unforeseen circumstances, and a theory of meaning -- Eliciting legislative preferences -- Canons favoring the politically powerless -- Linguistic canons of statutory construction -- Interpretations that may create international conflict -- Explaining seeming inconsistencies in statutory stare decisis -- Tracking the preferences of political subunits -- Tracking high court preferences -- The fit with prior political science models and empirical data -- Interest group and collective choice theory -- Protecting reliance or avoiding change or effect -- Rebutting operational and jurisprudential objections.
Bibliography noteIncludes bibliographical references (p. 337-380) and index.
LCCN 2007014164
ISBN9780674024601 (alk. paper)
ISBN0674024605 (alk. paper)

Availability

Library Location Call Number Status Item Actions
Joyner General Stacks KF 425 .E44 2008 ✔ Available Place Hold