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LEADER 06101ctm 2200565 i 4500
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ocm35056491
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OCoLC
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20230322091322.0
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960711s1972 xx bm 000 0 eng d
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a| (OCoLC)35056491
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a| EREE
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4
a| DA47.9.I48
b| H56 1972
100
1
a| Hinnant, Jesse Ray,
c| Jr.,
e| author.
?| UNAUTHORIZED
245
1
0
a| British foreign policy during the Indo-China crisis of 1954 /
c| by Jesse Ray Hinnant, Jr.
264
0
c| 1972.
300
a| xi, 228 leaves ;
c| 29 cm
336
a| text
b| txt
2| rdacontent
337
a| unmediated
b| n
2| rdamedia
338
a| volume
b| nc
2| rdacarrier
502
b| M.A.
c| East Carolina University
d| 1972
500
a| Submitted to the faculty of the Department of History.
500
a| Advisor: Kathleen E. Dunlop
520
3
a| The purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate how the British took a firm stand in their foreign policy to play a dominant part in settling the Indo-Chinese war of 1954. Of all the nations vitally concerned with this war in Southeast Asia, Great Britain was the only one who was able to take a detached view of the extremely complicated situation. The British believed that the senseless seven year old Franco-Viet Minh conflict should be ended by a negotiated settlement. Britain's close ally, the United States, did not share this view and urged the British to join them in a different course of action. The United States did not like the idea of any type of compromise which would leave the Communists in possession of any part of Indo-China, This is why the United States wanted the British to join them in armed intervention in Southeast Asia so that the French could win militarily and completely expel the Communists from political control. The British would like to have seen a French victory in Indo-China; however, armed intervention with the United States had many drawbacks. First of all, the British thought a negotiated settlement would be more preferable than a military victory. Secondly, there was the Chinese to think about. Heretofore, they had not taken an active part in this conflict in Indo-China; however, there was a very good probability that if the British and Americans began to actively help the French, the Chinese would intervene on the side of the Viet Minh; and the Third World War would be underway. The British were also over-extended militarily, unable to finance an intervention scheme, interested in keeping on friendly relations with the nations of Southeast Asia so as to increase trade, and fearful that intervention might entail nuclear weapons. Finally, the British did not want to antagonize the Asian members of the Commonwealth who saw the proposed Anglo-American intervention as an effort to bolster French colonialism. The British evaluated the proposal, decided that the cons far outweighed the pros, and advised the United States that they had to reject such a scheme. A conference was convened at Geneva to find a negotiated settlement to the Indo-China war. The British played an instrumental, part in helping to find an agreement to all concerned countries attending the conference. The negotiations were very difficult, and the United States certainly did not help in making these negotiations easier. To the dismay of the British, the Americans wanted to disrupt the Geneva Conference so that military intervention in Indo-China would be necessary. The British compromised with the Americans and did everything possible, without sacrificing the main tenets of Britain's policy, to obtain America's agreement to accept the agreement reached at Geneva. Besides dealing with the cantankerous Americans, the British representative to the conference, Anthony Eden, also had to deal with the Communists. Thanks to Eden the Geneva Conference did not become bogged down. Through his efforts, the Communists relented from their prior hard-line objectives and agreed to a settlement which the French and Americans could support. Throughout the Indo-China crisis during the spring of 1954, the British constantly urged for compromise and a negotiated settlement. They faced pressures from many sides; however, they remained steadfast in their policy-- compromising whenever the situation merited such action but never to a degree where they sacrificed their principles.
504
a| Includes bibliographical references (leaves 220-228).
651
0
a| Great Britain
x| Foreign relations
z| Indochina.
=| ^A30497
651
0
a| Indochina
x| Foreign relations
z| Great Britain.
=| ^A342115
651
0
a| Great Britain
x| Foreign relations
z| Indonesia.
=| ^A30497
651
0
a| Indonesia
x| Foreign relations
z| Great Britain.
=| ^A34717
650
7
a| Diplomatic relations.
2| fast
0| (OCoLC)fst01907412
651
7
a| Great Britain.
2| fast
0| (OCoLC)fst01204623
?| UNAUTHORIZED
651
7
a| Indochina.
2| fast
0| (OCoLC)fst01243492
?| UNAUTHORIZED
651
7
a| Indonesia.
2| fast
0| (OCoLC)fst01209242
?| UNAUTHORIZED
655
7
a| Academic theses.
2| fast
0| (OCoLC)fst01726453
655
7
a| Academic theses.
2| lcgft
655
7
a| Thèses et écrits académiques.
2| rvmgf
0| (CaQQLa)RVMGF-000001173
700
1
a| Dunlop, Kathleen E.,
e| degree supervisor.
?| UNAUTHORIZED
710
2
a| East Carolina University.
b| Department of History.
=| ^A636991
856
4
1
z| Access via ScholarShip
u| http://hdl.handle.net/10342/10478
949
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