| Summary |
The purpose of this study is to show that British public reaction to France's General Georges Ernest Jean Marie Boulanger between 1886 and 1891 attained sufficient proportions as to merit treatment and further study. During this period, the Boulanger crisis in France elicited widespread response in Great Britain in the form of newspaper reports, journal articles, diplomatic correspondence, and personal accounts. By analyzing these reactions, this study attempts to discover the extent and significance of the effect of the Boulangist phenomenon on British foreign policy and public tranquility. The Boulangist affair with its accompanying threat of a Franco-German war jeopardized two basic tenets of British foreign policy-- maintaining the status quo in Europe and insuring Belgian neutrality. After becoming French minister of war in 1886, Boulanger stirred national pride to the point that the revanche concept was activated in the minds of many Frenchmen, and Germary naturally responded sensitively to this threat to her security, The resulting war-scare during the spring of 1887 caused Britain considerable concern, for, needless to say, the thought of a possible continental, war in which she could become involved was alarming. Although a change in the French cabinet in Hay 1867 led to the General's removal from his position of minister of war and to his departure from Paris, many British observers still viewed him as a dangerous menace. In others who believed that Boulanger himself was finished politically, his brief popularity intensified distrust of French mass-type democracy and volatile national sentiment, of which he was a product. During 1888, Boulanger's dismissal from the French army and entrance into politics again affected British policy. The bellicosity developing from the movement that centered around him found reflection in French foreign policy and so threatened European stability. One result was friction between Anglo-French colonial interests sufficient to push the two countries to the verge of war and force British foreign policy into 'the wake of that of the Central Powers. In addition to these developments, the British saw in Boulanger the incarnation of the French desire for empire, and consequently fear developed that Britain would be the object of this imperialistic thrust. Anxiety, therefore, intensified during the spring of 1888 until Britishers were at least affecting to envision a possible invasion of Britain under Boulanger. This "invasion scare" became one of the contributory causes of the introduction and passage of the Naval Defense Act of 1889--itself, however relatively remote, a contributory cause of the First World War. |
