| Summary |
The purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate that difficulties in the WW II battle for Iwo Jima resulted from faulty military intelligence. Misjudgments of Japanese intentions and capabilities resulted in excessive loss of life and extended the campaign. However, the intent of this thesis is not to criticize the intelligence community, but rather to illustrate that good military intelligence is vital to successful military operations, and that good intelligence is often difficult to obtain. At the same time, this thesis shows that historians, did not record intelligence shortcomings that affected the Iwo Jima campaign. The Joint Intelligence Center/Pacific Ocean Area's (JICPOA) pre-battle intelligence reports on Iwo Jima, differed from the situation that Marines encountered on the island. After-battle intelligence reports also differed from pre-battle reports. Interviews with former JICPOA officer and career intelligence officer Rear Admiral Donald M. Showers revealed how the Pacific's intelligence community was formed, how it operated, and how it performed. Rear Admiral Showers provided data on intelligence in general: how it is categorized, how it is important, and how it is used. The main findings of the thesis are that intelligence mistakes caused military planners to believe Iwo Jima was less formidable than it actually was. These errors led the American military leaders to plan inadequately for the assault. However, intelligence mistakes regarding Iwo Jima were unavoidable. The momentum of the war in the Pacific from late 1944 on forced intelligence personnel to deal with several major projects at the same time. Consequently, JICPOA's manpower and equipment were spread thin, and the result was an inadequate campaign for Iwo Jima. Only constant surveillance of the island, an impossibility at the time, could have produced an accurate intelligence report. |
