| Summary |
In response to the German U-boat attacks on Allied Atlantic merchant shipping during the Second World War, Ernest King, the Commander-in-Chief of the Atlantic Fleet, approved construction of a defensive wall of naval mines in an area off Cape Hatteras, North Carolina. This configuration of mines was intended to provide a safe harbor opportunity for convoys moving along the coast. The currently accepted narrative of Cape Hatteras Minefield is that it was a failure. This assessment is due to recent scholarship which cites the loss of three Allied ships that sunk after striking mines intended for Axis watercraft. As opposed to studies of the effectiveness of offensive or defensive weapons on mobile platforms (ships, aircraft, and terrestrial vehicles) or land-based defensive structures (e.g. forts and gun emplacements), this study will seek to understand the ways in which researchers can assess the success or failure of a different kind of defensive measure -- a naval minefield. In-depth historical research will be undertaken in order to better understand the social, economic, and wartime effects of the minefield. Archaeological theories sourced from battlefield archeology will also be applied to a virtually reconstructed minefield data set created with Geographic Information System (ESRI ArcGIS). The objectives of this project are to reassess how minefields are contemplated in battlefield archeology in a naval setting as well as to reconsider the narrative of Cape Hatteras minefield itself. |
| General note | Presented to the faculty of the Program in Maritime Studies of Department of History. |
| General note | Advisor: Nathan Richards. |
| General note | Title from PDF t.p. (viewed June 14, 2017). |
| Dissertation note | M.A. East Carolina University 2016. |
| Bibliography note | Includes bibliographical references. |
| Technical details | System requirements: Adobe Reader. |
| Technical details | Mode of access: World Wide Web. |
