| Abstract |
For hundreds of years before the first flight at Kittyhawk on December 17, 1903, man had sought to gain the ultimate view from the sky. There were as many ideas about how the ability to fly could be of use as there were failed machines that attempted to accomplish it. This quest for air power, defined as the ability to conduct military, commercial, or humanitarian operations from the air, has had far-reaching implications not only for combat technology, but also in politics, diplomacy, technology, and mass culture. Where Alfred Thayer Mahan's classic work, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, catalogues the elements that made naval prowess a determinant of a nation's strength, this book studies the development of air-power philosophy by examining its theory and practice as demonstrated not only in war, but in the myriad demands it makes upon the nations that employ it. In air power, as in sea power, the evolution from concept to practical execution goes through many individuals, each improving on previous work. The personalities of the inventors emerge as important factors in the creation and application of the new technology. This book focuses extensively on the impact of these personalities on air power and, thus, their effect on history. Many factors influenced the development of air power, including entirely new technologies that, in recent years, have included the jet engine and precision-guided munitions. The influence of air power was aided immeasurably by the simultaneous growth of aviation, motion pictures, radio, and, later, television. In turn, the media's influence grew tremendously because of its profound ability to observe and transmit events around the globe, thereby imposing an urgency on both military and civilian life. The Influence of Air Power upon History is a thorough examination of how air power was applied from the very earliest days of the balloon down to the latest use of space technology. Including both air and aerospace military power in his considerations, Boyne (a retired U.S. Air Force colonel) surveys, in a celebratory fashion, the use of air power in international conflict. His analysis is perfectly in line with the technological fetishism of most U.S. war planners, almost invariably arguing that the imposition of superior air power is the most decisive factor in winning wars, and even suggesting that the American war in Vietnam would have been won with just a little more bombing. Chapters cover the development and deployment of air power doctrines by the United States, its allies, and its enemies in wars in which it was politically concerned. |
